

Crisis of Democracy and Constituency Governance in Nigeria: Implications and Pathway

Chibuikwe E Madubuegwu Phd¹, Ambrose Oluchukwu Abaneme Phd², Nwaneri Stanley Ikechukwu Phd³

¹Governance And Development Studies Programme Institute for Peace, Security And Development Studies, Ipsds. Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria.

Orcid Id: Orcid.Org/0009-0005-7990-9384

²Department Of Political Science Alvan Ikoku Federal University Of Education, Owerri, Nigeria.

Orcid Id: Orcid.Org/0009-0004-4629-3141

³Department of Political Science Alvan Ikoku Federal University of Education, Owerri, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT	ARTICLE DETAILS
Nigerian democracy is observably loud in symbolism but lacks in substance. From this irregularity, this paper examined current realities of constituency governance process in dynamics of crisis-infested democracy in Nigeria. The methodology of the discourse espouses the import of qualitative exploratory design in emphasis on secondary and empirical data through documentaries and non-participant observation as data elicited were content-analysed. The discourse applied Almond structural-functional theory to argue that crisis of Nigerian democracy stemmed from functional disorientation which had adversely undermined structures and process of constituency governance. The study further showed that democratic norms of accountability and transparency are not reflective in trustee-party mandate model of constituency representation as the docility of the constituents invariably created gap between expectations and legislative services. From these findings, the paper recommended for functional advocacy in appropriate orientation, delegate model of constituency representation, constituents' enthusiasm to demand for accountability, engaging and more inclusive processes that strengthen legislator-constituency relations among other fundamentals to bolster the impact of constituency governance in Nigeria. KEYWORDS: Constituency, Constituency Governance, Constituency Representation And Democracy.	Published On: 04 August 2026 Available on: https://ijiissh.com/

INTRODUCTION

Democracy is a cherished value. It's symbolic significance resonate from primacy of liberty and popular preferences. In this vein, constituency as a delineated geo-unit of election and representation conventionally provides avenue for constant interface between legislators and the people. In other words, the interface is expected to facilitate legislative expressions in motions, bills, oversight and projects that are in deference to concerns, plights and expectations of the constituents. From this indication, parliament and representation are fundamentals in constituency governance discourse and practice.

Nigerian democracy undoubtedly is weak and vulnerable. In this regard, Ochonwu (2010) revealed that for many Nigerians and Africans democracy has failed. It has failed to live up to its publicised benefits in tangible and intangible terms. Nigerians are disillusioned with a failed democracy. To add, Adegbam (2025) observed that the failure of successive governments to implement necessary measures to address numerous challenges facing the country has also led to doubts about the capacity of the current government to solve Nigeria's basic problems. The laxity in governance shown by successive Nigerian political leaders is evident in their steadily decreasing ability to address issues such as hunger, anger, frustration, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity, among other problems. To this effect, Mordi and Obianke (2025) stressed that failure of governance in Nigeria is a significant issue in literature.

From these unpleasant situations, this study therefore seeks to interrogate trend and processes of constituency governance in crisis of Nigerian democracy to establish effects and plausible prospects. To realise this objective, the discourse is divided in this

introduction, conceptual discourse, theoretical discourse, constituency governance in crisis of democracy in Nigeria, conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Discourse

Democracy as social reality and concept has transcended centuries and interpretations reflecting in varied practices across time and space. From direct process of ancient Greek City-States of 5th century BC to modern-representative government in the current 21st century, democracy has gained in relevance and spread amid limitations in practice across countries. Democracy in a subtle sense is a process that accord percepts of equity and fairness on how state should be constituted and what should inform policy choices of the government.

In a similar view, Rousseau, a political theorist posited that democracy is the government of the people for the general will of the people. To realise the general will of the people, the government must guarantee liberty for the people (Sabine and Thorson, 1973). Liberty arguably represents the bedrock of democratic practices. Liberty enables the electorate to choose between candidates, parties and ideologies in an elections. Also, liberty guaranteed in constitutional power and privileges conventionally predispose elected state functionaries to work in public interests and expectations.

Beyond the political process, democracy is strengthened by institutions. Thus, Report of Economic Commission for Africa (2018) document that the legislature represents one of the institutions advancing the process of democratic governance. In the 21st century, there is growing interest and concerns more than ever on issues related to democracy and governance around the world. This is a reflection of increasing acceptance of the fact that democracy and governance are not luxury but fundamental requirements to achieve sustainable development. In other words, parliament is one of the key state institutions that has a critical role to play in promoting democracy and good governance. As the democratically elected representatives of the people, parliaments have the honorable task to ensure government by the people and for the people. In the performance of key functions of legislations, representation and oversight, parliament can actively engage in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and practices that promote democracy and good governance.

From this indication, the presence of an accountable legislature underscored the imperatives of representative democracy. Undoubtedly, the legislature is an embodiment of democracy more than all other organs of government because of its roles in a democratic process (Dagogo, 2022). Hence, the presence of the legislature makes democracy meaningful as it represents a section of society and provides the link between the people and the government through their representatives (Olu and Irabor, 2020). The people represented in parliaments are found in constituencies.

Constituency in generic sense is an electoral geographical area represented in a legislative body by a lawmaker (single-member constituency) or lawmakers (multi-member constituencies). The electoral geographical unit known as constituency periodically elects a legislator or legislators to serve as representatives in parliament. In another perspective, Madubuegwu (2026) opined that constituency is not limited to a geographical area/district but extends to shared identity and interest that seeks for government indulgence in affinity of anxieties and expectations for policy, impact and feedback. Beyond this view, constituency is also seen as people, interest and expectation represented in legislative organ of modern government. From this process, the concept of constituency representation illuminates.

Again, Madubuegwu (2026) provided three broad conceptualizations of constituency representation:

- a. Constituency representation as delegate model of representation where plights and expectations of the constituents informed motions and bills of the lawmaker in the parliament and social welfare projects in the district area. In other words, the articulated opinion of the constituents in the way and manner their problems should be presented and addressed constitute the primacy of constituency representation.
- b. Constituency representation as trusteeship model of representation where the legislators understand anxieties and expectations of the constituents and, act to mainstream these interests in government. In other words, the legislator decides and acts on behalf of their constituents from understanding of what the challenges are and modalities of its solutions.
- c. Constituency representation as party-mandate model of representation where legislators acknowledged and respond to aspirations and expectations of the constituents in fidelity to party symbolic relevance in parliamentary obligations. In other words, party politicking enormously influence parliamentary bills, motions and projects as the legislator try to accommodate interests of political party stakeholders in the constituency as observed in Nigerian type of democracy.

From Madubuegwu's broad perspective in constituency representation, certain indices of governance process reflect significantly to elicit the need for conceptualisation. On concept of governance, Opeyemi, et al (2025) remarked that governance is a multidisciplinary concept in the social sciences literature. It means how society or an organization operates or steers to achieve its specific aims. In explicit view, governance is an expression of the state/government policies reflecting in form or/ effectiveness of the measures taken. In a similar view, governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. Governance also connotes exercising sovereign power over a particular people living in a specific geographical land or entity (Report of Asian Development Bank, 1998). Subsequently, governance is also defined in context of managerial approach to posit the relevance of organization and efficiency in the processes of administration

which may not necessarily be connected with the government or state activities. A reference to corporate governance (Vymetal, 2007). In same vein, Smiley (2007) viewed governance as a process that depict how organization in a society operates. More succinctly, Madubuegwu and Maduekwe (2022) defined governance from a multi-dimension indicators; (a) As context which defines the nature, peculiarity and significance of goals and targets at the level of state, corporate and global process of engagement. (b) As structures institutionalized to perform expedient roles in public and corporate interests. (c) As process initiated to facilitate formulation and implementation of decisions (in form of policies, legislations) in realization of public expectations for development and safety or corporate expectations for profits. Furthermore, Madubuegwu (2025) revealed five fundamentals in the conceptualization of governance. First, its context is broad and classified. Secondly, it is a process of impact. Thirdly, it is purposeful and utilitarian. Fourthly, it is a practice that function within structures, legal framework and network of responsibilities, and fifthly, its drive ought to be guided by a model.

From the variously lucid insights on what constituency representation and governance appear to represent, constituency governance is defined as involving processes, structures and practices through which elected officials represent and interact with their geographically defined electoral district often facilitated by constituency offices and projects to enhance democratic representation. Thus, constituency governance bridges the gap between the constituents and the legislature aiming to foster communication, accountability and development (Wilson and Kerry, 2022). From this evinced view, constituency governance is further and broadly conceptualised as follows:

a. A process where legislators interface with constituents as expectations and concerns are articulated to inform legislative bills, motions and projects in constituency for improved socio-economic conditions. It also involve bureaucracies of structures and personnel at the level of constituency offices, parliament and appropriate executive offices for administration of utilitarian values in benefiting laws, oversight and projects for the constituency. And, its end resonates in feedback from the constituents on what have been done. In this perspective, the driving processes of constituency governance is observed in critical responsibilities handled by legislative aides of the lawmaker, staff/technocrats of the parliament and executive bureaucrats in appropriate government offices in ensuring that concerns raised by the constituents or constituency are addressed. In other words, the ethical values of this perspective of constituency governance reflect in sense of responsibility, openness, transparency and accountability.

b. A process of consistent interface between legislators and constituency stakeholders. The practice comes in more inclusive avenues for engaging interaction between the lawmaker and party leaders, council of traditional leadership, leadership of steering community development mechanism, leadership of faith institutions, leadership of community-based organisations, leadership of women forum, leadership of youths, leadership of vulnerable groups and leadership of non-indigenous residents on priority needs and concerns that requires legislative interventions. And, its end resonates in the significant impact of articulated aspirations in legislative motions, bills and projects as constituency stakeholders reach back to legislators on views/observations/commendations of the constituents in the constituency. In this perspective, the driving processes of constituency governance is observed in horizontal interface between legislators and stakeholders and, vertical communication between the stakeholders and constituents in their respective clusters and identities as concerns are identified for legislative services. In other words, the ethical values of this perspective of constituency governance reflect in obligation and communication, and accountability which bolster democratic legitimacy in legislator-constituent relations.

Constituency governance is a process of social interaction of impact and feedback. Essentially, certain democratic values and process are expedient for the realisation of its significance in deference to the expectations of the constituents. Beside the democratic values of participatory process, openness, transparency and accountability, there is also need for community of enlightened and enthused constituents ready to engage with a legislator of a democratic-mindset who is in hurry to represent and legislate for the development of the constituency.

THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

The scale of democracy and constituency governance are weighed in functional significance of its structures. To this end, theory of structural-functionalism is applied to underline trends and dynamics of constituency governance process in dysfunctional democracy of weak and vulnerable institutions.

Emphatically, structural-functionalism is a derivative of the systems analysis. The structural-functional framework explains basic functions performed by political structures in the political system, and its tool of investigation. Again, functionalism has its intellectual roots in the writings of social anthropologists like Radcliffe Brown and B Malinowski that appeared in the early decades of the present century (Johari, 2005). Almond and Powell and other behavioral and post-behavioral scholars later mainstreamed the logics of theory of structural-functionalism in political analysis. In structural-functional theory, it is argued that stability and development of a political system is a reflection of the functions performed by its structures. Succinctly, Almond provided systemic definition of political system as a framework of structures and functions which is a coherent whole that influence and, in turn are influenced by their environment.

As the name suggests, the structural-functional framework revolves around two concepts-structure and functions. Structure refers to those arrangement within the system which perform functions. Also, function refer to basic functions performed and under what conditions the performance of these functions are done. Political system has four characteristics described as legitimate patterns of interaction (Johari, 2005). Furthermore, these also constituted the logics of structural-functional framework:

1. Every political system has its structures specialized in performing basic functions.
2. There are observed differences between political systems in its structure, and function performed which underline the import of peculiarities.
3. Political structures perform a number of functions that may be termed as multi-functional.
4. All political system is always a mixture of traditional and modern. The political system being part of the society have its precedents and tradition (Johari, 2005; Gbuaa, 2003).

In further perspective, Verma (1974) revealed that Almond characterised political system in comprehensiveness, inter-dependence and existence of boundaries. A political system is comprehensive in the sense that it includes all the interaction-inputs as well as outputs from structures which affect the use of physical coercion. The political system is interdependent in the various subsets of the system which are closely connected with each other that a change in one sub-set produces a change in all sub-sets. The political system in boundary points where other systems end and the other political system begins. Again, Almond developed seven-variable functions. The input functions are political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation and interest aggregation, political communication while the output functions include rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication.

In other words, the structural-functional framework posited that every system has structures that are expected to work through instrumental functions for sustenance and persistence of the system. In democratic polity or governance process, structures and functions are very critical for efficiency, equilibrium and development. For critics or limitations of structural-functional analysis, Dahrendorf (2011) remarked that the theory rely more primarily on static relationship rather than on dynamics occasioned with fallacy of functional teleology and over-emphasis on structures and functions as process is ignored.

However, the logics of the theory of structural-functionalism are significant to this discourse.

First, the failure of Nigerian democracy is acknowledged as systemic irregularities where structures are weak and deficient in functions or roles. The democratic institutions of Nigerian state are seen in legislative assemblies at the level of national, state and local governments. However, these parliaments have not impressed Nigerians in issues and expectations of national development through legislative interventions. The common narrative among Nigerians that these legislative bodies are rubber-stamp of the executive organ, abysmally corrupt as transparency remain hoax and nonexistent, and its members, the parliamentarians are distanced from the aspirations of the people whom they claim to represent.

The role expectations in responsive, transparent and accountable functions are unrealisable from structures that are weak and vulnerable. In other words, Nigeria parliaments across levels of constituted authorities are dysfunctional in enormous public expectations in legislations for security, oversight of executive arms for efficient policy administration and implementation, and constituency service delivery for improved social welfare.

The unviability of Nigerian legislative structures and functions stemmed from the challenges that are systemic and stretched. The democracy of Nigerian political system as earlier noted is fraught with myriad irregularities that breeds weak institutions and functional disorientation which undermines expectations of constituency governance. Notably, many Nigerians as constituents in cities and rural areas are reluctant to engage with the legislators on priority needs of the constituencies. This challenge obviously emanate from climate of widespread irregularities.

In conclusive sense, the assumptions of structural-functionalism will provide the framework of analysis on structures and process of constituency governance which are adversely eroded by systemic crisis of Nigerian democracy. Thus, theory of structural-functionalism will offer insights in effects and implications which will inform the need for policy.

Constituency Governance in Crisis of Democracy in Nigeria

As opined that Nigerian democracy is crisis-infected which however needed to be logically established. In a historic sense, Iboi (2020) recalled that Nigerian state assumed a new governance status in 1999 following the demise of authoritarian regime in the country. Since restoration of democratic rule in the country, change of government has been orderly while elections have been periodic. However, hope were dashed as the following challenges persisted:

- i. Elections in the Fourth Republic have been characterized by monumental irregularities and malpractices which magnitude increases in every election cycle. Even though Nigeria has experienced uninterrupted civilian government since 1999 but elections bringing these administrations are often marred with lot of malpractices.
- ii. In Nigeria, the public sector is not accountable to the people. It appear like there is a divide between what goes on in government and what is being reported to the citizens. Transparency is not a culture among Nigerian public officials.
- iii. Inequality in the distribution of resources is also a failure of democracy. Nigeria has substantial natural resources to accommodate its expanding population but only few people in the country have access to the money generated from the resources. A large proportion of the citizens are living below poverty line amidst the massive wealth in the country.

iv. Corruption is another major challenge of Nigerian democracy. For instance, the Transparency International in 2016 projected Nigeria as the second most corrupt country in the world. Political and economic corruption in Nigeria are endemic.

In another sense, Opeyemi et al (2025) indicated that Nigeria's democracy is afflicted with limitations on freedom of speech. Many Nigerians have suffered victimization and molestation while some were killed because of their opinions concerning government and governance. In addition, elite representation is another big challenge of democracy in Nigeria. Political positions are for the elite only, in which the have-nots cannot vie because of restricted access which undermines equity and fairness. The elite are using a political party as a hindrance tool to prevent the have-nots from vying for political positions. For example, in the 2023 general election APC sold the party ticket at an exorbitant price. Similarly is lack of internal democracy in political parties and political apathy among many Nigerians. Most Nigerians have lost hope in the country to the extent that it is a diminutive population that prays for Nigeria's development.

On the contrary, some other scholars shared view that democracy has advanced in Nigeria amid set-backs considering the background of authoritarian military regimes and certain practices sustained over time. Akeem and Ashibi (2020) argued that a major issue about democracy in Nigeria is that as long as elections are being conducted where winners and losers emerged, and power successfully handed over from one government to another then democracy is on course. Hence, it is argued that under Nigeria's military regimes such processes were not contemplated. It is further argued that democracy has been sustained in Nigeria not by the credibility of the electoral process rather by processes which facilitated transition from one government to another government seen as profoundly democratic feats. To add, Kukah (2012) opined that the most visible dividend of democracy are cycle of elections and handing over which are considered as notable achievement.

However, these cycles of elections seen as democratic feats are rigged and abused. In Nigeria, election rigging is the major problem. The ruling and opposing political parties and candidates rig every election within their respective support base. This is a serious bane of bad political leadership in Nigeria. From these rigged polls, persons who don't have people's mandate will emerge to take up leadership responsibilities in executive and legislative organs which will consequently work against transparency and accountability in public offices (Kurfi, 2005, Awopeju, 2011). Consequently, Adeleke (2025) also remarked that laxity of political leaders and other public officials has continued to hinder development. Nigerian political leaders can imitate some governance systems from around the globe but they cannot replicate their patterns of progress and development due to their lax attitude. This is the major reasons for poor governance system characterized by corruption, mismanagement of resources, and poor service delivery. Invariably, these democratic setbacks and poor governance system as identified in scholarly submissions have had adverse effects on the process and impact of constituency governance in Nigeria. The structure of constituency representation in Nigeria reflects in single-member legislative services across four layers of legislator-constituent relations (ward, state, federal house of representative and senatorial). It is expected that governance processes in Nigerian constituencies should be service-oriented in impacting laws, motions, town halls and projects to ameliorate hardship among Nigerian populace and improve the economy.

However, the scenarios of constituency governance in crisis of Nigerian democracy observed across most states of the federation are identified below:

1. The trustee-party mandate model of constituency representation is predominantly entrenched in Nigerian legislative system. Nigerian legislators determine priority needs of the constituency and decide on modalities with less input or none from the constituents. In most constituencies from north to south, there is absence of genuine process to interface, indulge and know what the challenges are especially from the lips of non-partisan stakeholders and constituents rather serious efforts are seen to pacify interests of party leaders and members in location of constituency projects and other benefits like employment slots, bursary awards, empowerment schemes etc. At least 80 percent of beneficiaries of legislative services in Nigerian constituencies today are party stakeholders and members. It was deliberately done by the lawmakers to reinforce loyalty and gain support of the party in politics of re-election against opponents.
2. Town hall meetings as avenue for interface between Nigerian lawmakers and the constituents are rarely hosted for indulgence and interactions. On some occasions, the town hall meetings often turned into partisan rallies as party stakeholders, members and support groups take turn to laud personality of the lawmaker and show solidarity as core issues of constituency plights and expectations are swept under the carpet.
3. Laws and motions that are insignificant to what the constituents actually want? The wide gap between the legislators and the constituents is the outcome of irrelevant laws and motions to address exigent needs of the constituents in social welfare conditions.
4. Docility of the constituents in legislative and representative matters. Most Nigerians in urban and rural constituencies are not enthused to ask questions and demand for legislative services and accountability from the legislators rather "everything" are left in the hands of party stakeholders and members.
5. Absence of constituency offices to coordinate bureaucracy of constituency governance between parliament and constituency. Most Nigeria lawmakers have unfortunately turned their offices at legislative chambers into constituency offices where constituents frequently come and make demands. In other words, there is no legislator's office in the constituency. This practice is very common

among lawmakers at the state level of legislating (members of state houses of assembly). This unpleasant development has unfortunately undermined efficiency in handling constituency matters and issues.

6. Lastly, corruption in constituency project delivery in Nigeria. In this vein, Awofeso and Irabor, (2020) revealed that introduction and implementation of constituency projects in national and state assemblies in Nigeria has generated controversial debate among scholars, policy analysts and other critical stakeholders across the country. Allegations abound about how some legislators embezzle the funds of the constituency projects and divert funds meant for the provision of boreholes and public health services, renovations of roads and parking facilities, lighting of public spaces and roadways. Hence, serving as the conduit pipe through which lawmakers embezzled money (Niyi, 2016; Gbajabiamila, 2014; Yakubu, 2016; Abdulrazak, 2016; Awofeso & Irabor, 2020; Nwankwo and Iwuala, 2022). In examining different shades of corruption in constituency project delivery, Oji (2016) revealed that on a yearly basis, billions of naira is appropriated to enable legislators in the National Assembly and across the 36 states of the country to carry out intervention projects in constituencies. In the 2016 national budget for example, N100 billion was voted for the constituency projects of the 360 members of the House of Representatives and 109 senators. Constituency projects are widely seen as avenue to bring developmental projects to constituencies however it was not so. One of the accusations against the legislators regarding constituency projects that after payment the contractors settles the legislator and abandons the project (cited in Dagogo, 2022).

More revealing, Iredia (2016) also stressed that although constituency projects are advertised as required by law. However, lawmakers have devised dubious ways of ensuring that only companies fronting for them or those belonging to their cronies are pre-qualified. Again, Egburonu et al (2017) averred that what most of these lawmakers do is to identify those stakeholders and party chieftains who can give them trouble in the communities and buy them over with an understanding that they will have some percent from the approved constituency projects. Once the legislators offer the agreed amount, the identified leaders look away, kept quiet and allow the lawmakers to get away with the diversion or non-delivery of constituency projects. So, when some lawmakers get their allocations and refuse to execute these projects then the communities become dismayed and disillusioned.

From these scholarly observations, it is evident that constituency governance process in Nigeria is immersed with myriad of daunting irregularities that undermined transparency and accountability in legislative services and representation. These adverse scenarios have persisted unabatedly because of the following systemic-dysfunctional factors:

- a. The orientation and practice of trustee-party mandate constituency representation prevalent in legislator-constituent relations in Nigeria has undermined enhanced input-matrix in constituency governance process.
- b. Absence of institutional checks on legislative roles in Nigerian constituencies. In this situation, the Nigeria lawmakers are not compelled by law and institutional checks rather by discretion to hold town hall meeting with their constituents. In other words, the legislators in Nigerian legislative system are not under obligation in law to initiate interactive forum in their constituencies which has invariably restricted avenue of indulgence and accountability.
- c. Nigerians are disillusioned with the prevailing culture of impunity in governance. Many have lost interest in public affairs and faith in government.....As many don't find enthusiasm to engage government officials on issues of public accountability while others preferred to be apathetic towards issues of governance and state.
- d. Prevailing culture of nonchalant attitude among many Nigerian legislators towards plights and expectations of Nigerians is an enabling factor in the deficiency of constituency governance. Also, many Nigerian lawmakers are not anxious and bothered to look into challenges of the constituencies they represent. Whatever were legislative services provided by these lawmakers in their respective constituencies are done discretionally in isolation of compelling laws and institutional checks.
- e. The Independent Corrupt Practice and Other Related Offences, ICPC and the Economic Financial Crime Commission, EFCC have not been prudent in tracking constituency project services from budget proposals to approvals and administration. The failure of these anti-graft agencies has aided embezzlement of fund appropriated for the implementation of constituency projects across the federation.
- f. Similarly, Federal Ministry of Finance and Federal Ministry of Works are grappling with challenges of corruption as personnel compromised and failed to ensure transparent administration of constituency service delivery through transparent monitoring and supervision compliances required. These sharp practices continue to militate against expectations of Nigerians for efficient service delivery in constituencies across states of the federation.
- g. The failure of the Nigerian Media and Civil Society Organisations to provide platforms for awareness and advocacy has further worked against constituency governance process. Hence, such platforms would have provided opportunity for engaging discourses on constituency governance performance in service and stewardship.
- h. Lastly, the irregularities in constituency governance in Nigeria persisted because of the abuse of Nigerian elections. The crises of credibility and transparency in Nigerian parliamentary elections at the levels of national, state and local government have led to the emergence of unpopular parliamentarians without popular mandate whose loyalty lies with party stakeholders not the people or the constituents whose votes does not count.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The deficiency of constituency governance process in Nigerian legislative services is a reflection of the country's type of democracy which is weak and dysfunctional. In this paper, challenges of Nigerian democracy and governance were illuminated. Also, concepts of democracy, legislature, constituency, constituency representation, governance and constituency governance were explored and dissected. The discourse further discussed constituency governance in crisis of democracy in Nigeria explicating on dynamics and trends in adverse implications and conditions susceptible. From these findings the following recommendations are embellished:

1. The item, "constituency governance" should be enlisted as a legislative agenda at national and sub-national levels of parliaments. The leadership of National Assembly, State Assemblies and Local Legislative Councils should advocate for the item to create sense of responsibility among lawmakers to strengthen constituency governance of impact.
2. The Nigerian Media and Civil Society Organisations, CSOs should advocate for delegate model of constituency representation as a practice in legislator-constituent relations against trusteeship model of constituency representation. The advocacy among Nigerian lawmakers will create sense of new orientation in parliamentary responsibility and bolster constituency governance of value and impact across states of the federation.
3. Sensitization and advocacy on public accountability in constituency governance process. The Civil Society Organisations, CSOs should mobilise and educate Nigerians as constituents in cities and rural areas to demand for legislative accountability from their lawmakers in representation and service delivery in their constituencies.
4. Constituency stakeholders in cities and rural areas should demand for inclusive and engaging town hall meetings with their representatives at local, state and national levels of legislating. The interactive avenue will bolster and reinforce constituency governance process of impact in Nigerian legislative system.
5. The Anti-graft agencies, the ICPC and EFCC should also strengthen its internal mechanism to check and track implementation of constituent projects across states of the federation. This measure will entrench transparency and accountability in administration and execution of constituency projects in Nigerian constituencies.
6. Lastly, the election management body, INEC is tasked to ensure credible parliamentary elections that will facilitate emergence of lawmakers who hold popular mandate and goodwill. It will further enhance constituency governance of impact across the federation.

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